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CONTRACTS-DEVELOPING CONCEPTS OF
UNCONSCIONABILITY
Section 2-302 of the Uniform Commercial Code' is a widely
discussed and controversial statement of the law of unconsciona-
bility. It was a part of the original UCC as adopted by Pennsyl-
vania in 1953, but some states elected to omit that section when
they accepted the UCC. 2 There are three fundamental reasons for
their not adopting the section. The first objection is that the sec-
tion goes against the security of the transaction by allowing the
courts to remake parts of the contract. The second stems from the
fact that the section limits the parties' freedom to contract be-
cause it is often interpreted to allow an inquiry into the fairness of
the exchange.3 The third involves the vagueness of the section due
to its lack of definitions or any precise explanation of the concept.'
All of these objections are legitimate to some extent, but there are
other factors which outweigh the negative aspects and make the
adoption of section 2-302 advantageous.
The law of unconscionability under section 2-302 has ex-
panded greatly in the last ten years and is still developing. The
courts today are using the section more readily in settling disputes.
This could be due either to a better understanding by the courts
of what the section encompasses or to a feeling on the part of the
courts that this is the best way to an equitable result in most cases.
Whatever the reasons, the law has developed quickly, and it is
important to see where the law stands at the present time.
U.C.C. § 2-302 provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the
contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the appli-
cation of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable re-
sult.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting,
purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
I California and North Carolina did not include the section when they adopted
the UCC, but North Carolina incorporated the section six years later in 1971.
California has still not adopted it.
3 Comment, Unconscionable Sales Contracts and UCC Section 2-302, 45 VA.
L. REV. 583 (1959).
Bush & Hurd, Unconscionability: A Matter of Conscience for California
Consumers, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1973).
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MEANING OF THE WORD UNCONSCIONABILITY
To begin a discussion of any concept it is first necessary to
define that concept. Unconscionability is a doctrine that has been
known in our courtrooms since the nineteenth century. One of the
first cases to discuss the issue was decided in 1889, when an un-
conscionable bargain was described as one "which no man in his
senses, not under delusion, would make, on the one hand, and
which no fair and honest man would accept on the other. . . .5
This definition is a popular one and has been mentioned often in
more recent cases.' Another definition commonly offered involves
unconscionability as affronting one's sense of decency. A promisor
can be relieved of his duty only "when the transaction affronts the
sense of decency without which business is mere predation and the
administration of justice an exercise in bookkeeping." 7 The first
definition seems to be based only on what transpires between the
two contracting parties and what results are received by them,
while the second is just as concerned about the transaction's effect
on society and the business world. A final definition describes un-
conscionability as "improvidence, total one-sidedness, oppression
or unfairness in other respects, as distinguished from illegality or
fraud."8 This definition seems to closely follow the intent of the
UCC as alluded to in Comment 1 of section 2-302 which says, in
essence, that a clause must be one sided to be unconscionable, and
that the principle overriding the entire section is the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise.'
Unconscionability or an unconscionable term is not defined in
the UCC nor is there any place where the specific elements in-
volved are set out. It has been suggested that this omission was an
oversight by the draftsmen, but the better view seems to be that
it was intended. A strict definition of the word unconscionability
would have a substantial effect on our commercial law. If there
were a strict definition of the word, instead of general guidelines
for the court to apply in determining what is unconscionable, it
would be possible for a party to draft a contract which barely
avoided coming within the definition but violated the spirit of
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406, 410 (1889).
See, e.g., Neal v. Lacob, 334 N.E.2d 435, 439 (Ill. 1975); Martin v. Approved
Bancredit Corp., 224 Ga. 550, 553, 163 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1969).
Gimble Bros. Inc. v. Swift, 62 Misc. 2d 156, 158, 307 N.Y.S.2d 952, 954 (1969).
Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1305, 1306 (1968).
U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 1.
[Vol. 80
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unconscionability, thereby defeating the purpose of the doctrine.'"
Unconscionability is a doctrine that should be decided on a case-
by-case basis because what is unconscionable in one factual set-
ting may not be in another. It is basically a subjective theory.* It
seems this was known to the draftsmen because they included
section 2-302(2) which directs the court to look at the transaction
in the commercial setting" and leads to different results in differ-
ent settings. This argues for the proposition that the omission of
the definition was not a result of oversight but rather was due to
the careful reasoning and considerations of the authors. What is
unconscionable is a matter left up to the judge's determination
since, according to section 2-302(1), unconscionability is a matter
of law to be decided in the court's discretion.
The section not only does not define unconscionability, but it
does not even suggest to the courts what tools they can apply to
label a contract unconscionable. Karl Llewellyn, the principal
draftsman of section 2-302, said the unconscionable provision of
the UCC will lead appellate courts into a "machinery for striking
down where striking down is needed ... ."I' But the section does
not provide the machinery; it merely leads the courts toward the
machinery that the courts themselves must create.1 3 The thought
here is that requiring the courts to create their own standards of
unconscionability will result in more predictability and allow them
to develop the law in accordance with the needs of society." The
courts will then be able to set their own standards for unconsciona-
bility and can decide subsequent cases on precedent instead of
interpretation of statutes. If the draftsmen of the section had sup-
plied a detailed definition of the word, the development of the case
law would most likely have been choked off. The draftsmen proba-
bly came to the conclusion that with the continuing development
of our economic system and the changing ideas, concepts, and
values that accompany it, the law must be free to evolve at the
same time. The easiest way to allow this is not to restrict the courts
with rigid definitions and tests which may envelop only certain
10 Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 931,
941 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Spanogle].
" See note 1 supra.
,2 K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 369 (1960).
,3 Murray, Unconscionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Pirr. L. REv. 1, 36
(1969).
" Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
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contingencies, but to give the courts a broad and flexible standard
with which to work.
While the UCC does not give us a working definition of uncon-
scionability, it does provide a few hints we can use. The section
itself states that unconscionability is a matter of law to be decided
by the court and not the jury. 5 This question of law is to be decided
in consideration of the underlying questions of fact that existed at
the time the contract was made.'" The facts are looked to for the
purpose of finding contracts that are so one-sided as to make the
contract or clause unconscionable. The principle involved here,
according to the Comment, is the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise. But the prevention of these procedural abuses" is
not all that was contemplated by Llewellyn. He also indicated that
it was necessary to find some unreasonable or unfair term in the
contract, since the main purpose of section 2-302 is to relieve one
of a grossly unfair bargain. The draftsmen's Comment continues
with the notion that the principle of prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise should in no way amount to a disturbance of the
allocation of risks due to superior bargaining power. The section
is not an attempt to alter one's freedom to contract, but is, rather,
to be used to help those people, who, because of some handicap,
either self-imposed or imposed on them by another, are unable to
help themselves. Freedom to contract protects the contract when
both parties have the ability to negotiate and make a meaningful
choice as a result of the negotiations. When these abilities are
abrogated or extinguished by the stronger party, freedom to con-
tract is no longer present and the unconscionability doctrine
should be invoked.
In considering section 2-302, it is important to remember the
good faith requirement prevailing throughout the UCC.' s This con-
cept is especially pertinent when the seller is an experienced pro-
fessional man and the buyer is so inexperienced or uneducated that
he is open for exploitation. In this type of situation the good faith
U.C.C. § 2-302(1).
W. L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Ore. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
I? The term "abuses" is adopted here to refer to practices or circumstances
which are factors in the determination that a contract is unconscionable. The term
"unconscionability" is sometimes used in the same way, but the author finds that
usage somewhat confusing.
'" U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(b). "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty
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in which the bargaining was carried out is more closely scrutinized,
and it is easy to equate unconscionability with deception, fraud,
false pretense, and misrepresentation, even to the point that in
extreme situations these concepts seemingly become interchange-
able.'9 The better view seems to separate these concepts, and we
should look to unconscionability only in the absence of fraud.
COURTS' INTERPRETATIONS OF UNCONSCIONABILITY
Most cases involving unconscionability have mentioned both
procedural and substantive abuses. Procedural abuses are the op-
pression and unfair surprise referred to in Comment 1 of section
2-302. Professor Arthur A. Leff defines a procedural abuse as
"bargaining naughtiness."2 It involves any abuse that comes into
play during the preliminary negotiations of the contract and
usually results in a lack of meaningful choice for one party. Sub-
stantive abuses, on the other hand, are the evils in the final con-
tract usually resulting in some harm being done to one party or
some unnecessary burden being placed upon him.2' The presence
of these two abuses has been the deciding factor in most uncon-
scionability cases.22
In searching for these abuses, it is important that we look at
the circumstances existing at the time of the contract's execution.
Evidence of the commercial background and setting and also the
custom and usage in the trade involved can possibly alleviate the
unconscionability of the transaction. Therefore, to label a contract
unconscionable, three things are usually looked to: 1) the pres-
ence of a procedural abuse; 2) the presence of a substantive abuse;
and 3) the commercial background or setting of the transaction.
The two abuses will be discussed separately herein, in the context
of the commercial background and setting.
Procedural A buses
Unfair surprise is the deception found in the drafting of an
instrument which involves concealing important facts in fine print
or inserting clauses that a lay person may not be able to under-
2" Kugler v. Romain, 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
2 Leff, Unconscionability and the Code: The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REv. 485, 487 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff].
2, Id. at 487.
" J. WmrTE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-7 (1970).
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stand . There are overtones of fraud involved in this concept due
to the concealment of facts, but unfair surprise does not involve
the misrepresentation of a fact which is necessary for fraud. 4 Op-
pression, connoting duress, is basically the lack of opportunity to
codetermine terms due to one party taking unfair advantage of his
position.' The most common example is the contract of adhesion,
where one party has no choice at all in the terms of the contract.
Unconscionability is not to be used merely for the sake of
relieving one from a bad bargain brought on by an unequal alloca-
tion of risks resulting from superior bargaining power. It takes
more than the bad bargain resulting from unequal bargaining
power to constitute unconscionability. To be unconscionable, the
procedural abuse of oppression or unfair surprise must be present
along with the bad bargain. The procedural abuse is found when
there is a lack of meaningful choice in the process of making the
contract and is based on either consumer ignorance or the seller's
deceptive practices. The presence of a procedural abuse is a subjec-
tive matter depending upon factors such as the education, relative
knowledge of the subject, and economic situation of each contract-
ing party. What is a procedural abuse with respect to one individ-
ual may not be such with another.
One type of consumer ignorance is brought out in the case of
Frostifresh v. Reynoso.26 The contract here involved the sale of a
refrigerator-freezer to the Spanish-speaking defendants. The nego-
tiations were conducted by a Spanish-speaking salesman who told
the defendants they would have no trouble paying for the freezer
because they would be paid commissions on the sales made to their
friends and neighbors. During the negotiations, plaintiff's sales-
man was aware that Reynoso's job was to terminate in one week
and should have realized this sale would be a financial hardship
to him. The retail installment contract signed by defendants was
written in English and was never translated or explained to them
and provided for a contract sales price of $900 plus a credit charge
of $245.88 making a total purchase price of $1145.88. The cost of
the appliance to the plaintiff corporation was $348. The court
found the contract unconscionable and said it was "too hard a
2 Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 758, 549 P.2d 903, 906
(1976).
2 Spanogle, supra note 10, at 943.
2 Id. at 950.
2 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
[Vol. 80
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bargain," but defendants were required to pay $348, the cost of
the appliance. 27 The court did not label anything a procedural
abuse in the opinion, but it did mention the "handicap" the de-
fendants were under due to their lack of knowledge because of the
language barrier.28
A more recent case involved a contract for the sale and instal-
lation of a gas conversion burner.2 9 Jimeniz, a Spanish-speaking
landlord in New York, was sued by Brooklyn Union Gas Company
after having defaulted in his payments on the burner. The contract
was written in English and was never explained to the defendant.
Plaintiff never negotiated directly with Jimeniz but induced his
tenants to put pressure on him to sign the contract. The court, in
finding the contract unconscionable, stated that the bargaining
positions were unequal due to the defendant's limited knowledge
of English, and as a result of this language barrier, he could not
protect himself. The court then took that responsibility on itself
saying, "since he cannot protect himself, the court must protect
him. .. ."30
Both cases seem to say that since the defendant had only a
limited knowledge of English, the bargaining positions were un-
equal. It is easy to see that one's inability to read the contract can
result in oppression and unfair surprise. It is oppressive in that it
takes advantage of a person's language handicap, and unfair sur-
prise comes about when one does not realize the effect of the
clauses contained in the contract because he cannot read them.
A second type of consumer ignorance closely related to the
first is the lack of education. In a 1971 Indiana case,"' the printed,
form contract involved was a gas station lease which contained a
hold harmless clause providing for the indemnification of the oil
company for any negligence by the oil company on the leased
premises. Weaver had left high school after one and a half years
and had no help in deciding on the agreement, nor did defendant
explain the hold harmless clause to him. Weaver signed the con-
tract with no knowledge of the clause which was in fine print and
contained no title heading. This action arose after one of the oil
2 Id. at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759-60.
Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
22 Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Jimeniz, 82 Misc. 2d 948, 371 N.Y.S.2d 289
(1975).
20 371 N.Y.S.2d at 292.
3, Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
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company's employees sprayed gasoline on Weaver and his assist-
ant causing them to be burned. Section 2-302 was discussed by the
court but was not controlling since no sale of goods was involved.
However, the abuses found in unconscionability were laid out and
the contract was found unenforceable. In discussing the abuse due
to lack of education, the opinion stated: "It seems a deplorable use
of justice to hold a man of poor education, to a contract prepared
by American Oil, for the benefit of American Oil which was pre-
sented to Weaver on a take it or leave it basis.' ",32
Another case shows that a person's education can wipe out a
procedural abuse.3 3 Plaintiff Neal owned an automobile dealership
and had been in that business for thirteen years. He held a college
degree and had been a teacher in the Chicago School Systems for
the six years preceding his association with the dealership. The
contract he entered into was drawn up by Lacob, a lawyer, and
provided for Lacob to lend Neal $5000 and guarantee him a $15,000
line of credit. In return, Neal was to furnish Lacob a car every year
and pay him $25 for each new car sold in addition to the repayment
of the loan. In discussing the unconscionability issue the court said
such factors as the age and education of the contracting parties
should be considered in addition to their experience and bargain-
ing positions.Y Plaintiff was a 40-year-old college graduate and had
been in the automobile business for several years. The negotiations
were conducted at arm's length, the contract was signed, and the
defendant paid substantial consideration. Therefore, the contract
was not found to be unconscionable.3 5 It was unimportant that the
allocation of risks was heavily in favor of the defendant. Thus,
procedural abuses are subjective and the education of the parties
is relevant.
A procedural abuse can also be found in many cases where the
consumer is poor. Many poor people have a misconception of the
value of money that will put them in an undesirable bargaining
position and make them ripe for exploitation by sellers. Jones v.
Star Credit Corp.38 is the leading example of this situation. Plain-
tiffs were welfare recipients and contracted with a salesman from
u Id. at 462, 276 N.E.2d at 147.
3 Neal v. Lacob, 31 Ill. App. 3d 137, 334 N.E.2d 435 (1975).
14 Id. at 144, 334 N.E.2d at 440.
35 Id.
1 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
[Vol. 80
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Your Shop At Home Service, Inc. for the purchase of a home
freezer. The price of the unit was set at $900 and the total purchase
price was $1234.80 which included credit charges, insurance and
tax. The Joneses had paid $619.88 toward the purchase before
defaulting. The trial record showed a maximum retail value of $300
for the freezer. The court, in finding the contract unconscionable,
discussed at length the price excessiveness, yet it did not base its
decision on that factor alone. "The very limited financial resources
of the purchaser, known to the sellers at the time of sale, is entitled
to weight in the balance."37 The court felt that this gross inequality
of bargaining power negated the meaningfulness of choice which
is vital in contracting.
Procedural abuses based on the deceptive practices of the
seller are of three major types. The first involves a contract con-
taining incomprehensible language. This abuse is clearly found in
a leading case decided in New Jersey prior to its acceptance of the
UCC.38 Henningsen purchased a new car from defendant's dealer-
ship in 1955 and gave it to his wife for Mother's Day. The purchase
order was a preprinted form containing small print clauses at the
bottom of the page. One clause stated that the buyer had read both
front and back of the agreement. Henningsen signed the agreement
without reading both sides. The back side was written in fine print
and explained Bloomfield's warranty disclaimers. The only war-
ranty available to plaintiff according to the agreement was for the
replacement of mechanical parts. Plaintiff did not realize this until
after his wife had an accident due to a defect in the car. Plaintiff
brought the action to recover for her personal injuries. The court
disallowed the warranty exclusion, and plaintiff recovered be-
cause, in the words of the court:
In the context of this warranty, only the abandonment of
all sense of justice would permit us to hold that, as a matter of
law, the phrase "its obligation under this warranty being lim-
ited to making good at its factory any part or parts thereof"
signifies to an ordinary reasonable person that he is relinquish-
ing any personal injury claim that might flow from the use of a
defective automobile.39
Another case involving incomprehensible language found the
buyer, Williams, signing a contract with a complicated cross-
Id. at 192, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 267.
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
31 Id. at 400, 161 A.2d at 93.
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collateral clause." Williams purchased a number of household
items from appellant for which payment was to be made in install-
ments. The printed form contract purported to lease the goods to
Williams with the title remaining in Walker-Thomas until all
monthly installments equalled the stated value of the items. The
cross-collateral clause, hidden in fine print, provided that all pay-
ments made on furniture sold to Williams "shall be credited pro
rata on all outstanding leases, bills and accounts due the Com-
pany by [purchaser] at the time each such payment is made." 4'
This incomprehensible language, hidden in fine print, did not sig-
nal to Williams that she would not own any furniture until every
installment of every purchase had been paid and therefore negated
her consent to the contract. "When a party of little bargaining
power, and hence little real choice, signs a commercially unreason-
able contract with little or no knowledge of its terms, it is hardly
likely that his consent, or even an objective manifestation of his
consent, was ever given to all the terms."4
The second deceptive practice of the seller is much more com-
mon. This procedural abuse is found in a clause written in fine
print. Karl Llewellyn, the chief draftsmen of UCC Section 2-302,
stated "fine print which has not been read has no business to
cut under the reasonable meaning of those dickered terms which
constitute the dominant and only real expression of agree-
ment. . . ."I' The cross-collateral clause in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., discussed above, was written in fine print
and the salesman did not specifically point it out. The court rea-
soned that Williams could not have consented to all the terms of
the contract if she did not even know they existed. It is in this type
of case that the courts should look to see if the terms of the contract
are so unfair that it should not be enforced.
More recently, the operator of a fertilizer plant brought suit
to recover for his burglary loss under his insurance policy, but was
denied recovery when the incident did not fit within the policy's
definition of a burglary." The definition of burglary set out in the
policy included a phrase requiring visible marks of entry made on
the exterior of the building. The definition was written in 6 point
, Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
, Id. at 447.
,2 Id. at 449.
' K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 370 (1960).
" C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
[Vol. 80
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type as compared to 24 point type appearing on the face of the
policy. Plaintiff's plant was burglarized and there was damage
done to the interior, but there were no marks on the exterior of the
buildings. The insurance company refused to pay. The court de-
cided that this liability-avoiding provision in the policy's defini-
tion was unconscionable. The court, in holding the contract un-
conscionable, said that this was a classic example of the proverbial
fine print clause which "becomes visible only after the event."45 It
was additionally suspect here where, instead of appearing logically
in the exclusions of the policy, it posed as a part of the esoteric
definition of burglary.
When looking at the "fine print" abuse cases, it is important
to remember that not all uses of fine print are unconscionable. This
print must also be unfair or unreasonable, in that it will work an
undue hardship on the buyer.
To see the importance and predominance of the third type of
procedural abuse, which is based on seller's guile, one need only
look at the drafting history of the UCC. All early drafts of that
document limited the application of the unconscionability section
to form contracts." Not until the 1948 draft was this reference to
"form contracts" deleted.4 7 The form contract referred to here is
but one part of an adhesive contract; there must be something else
present. This something else is the fact that the seller is either a
monopolist or oligopolist in his selling area. The buyer is denied
the possibility of making a bargained-for exchange because there
is no place else to make the purchase.
Adhesion contracts are found where the contract is a pre-
printed form and is actually a take-it or leave-it proposition. There
is no opportunity to dicker over the terms; therefore there is no
meaningful choice on the part of the buyer. A lack of meaningful
choice may lead to the negation of a party's manifestation of as-
sent, and in these cases he may not be liable for what he has
signed.
The classic example of a contract of adhesion is found in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 8 involving the sale of a
car. The standardized form contract imposed on the buyer in-
Id. at 179.
' Leff, supra note 20, at 492.
'T Id. at 495.
" 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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cluded warranties releasing the manufacturer from tort liability.
This contract was standard not only with Chrysler, but with Gen-
eral Motors and Ford, which three companies represented 93.5%
of the passenger-car production for the year in question. After
reviewing these facts, the court said that "[t]he gross inequality
of bargaining position occupied by the consumer in the automobile
industry is thus apparent,"49 and found this transaction void as
being against public policy because of the unfairness of the dis-
claimers and the lack of meaningful choice by the buyer.
The two elements of an adhesion contract appear in this situa-
tion. First, it is a standardized printed contract which discourages
bargaining for terms, and, second, the same or similar terms ap-
pear in all contracts for the purchase of automobiles used by major
automakers in the U.S. The buyer is forced to agree to these terms
in order to buy a new car. The consumer is given no real choice of
terms, for he has no other market to go to in order to shop around
for more advantageous contractual terms. Wherever he goes he will
run into the same type of limiting clause.
A more recent case refused to term a stock repurchase option
a contract of adhesion because the purchaser willfully entered into
the contract, it was highly beneficial to him, and his reasonable
expectations at contracting time were not frustrated." Despite its
refusal to label the contract as such, the court comprehensively
defined a contract of adhesion as a "standardized contract which,
imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength,
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere
to the contract or reject it."'" The court went on to say that a good
test of whether a contract is one of adhesion is whether the stronger
party has disappointed the reasonable expectations of the other
party.52 This fits in with the foregoing analysis because in order to
be termed unconscionable, not only must the contract be adhesive,
but it must also be unfair or do harm to the party which is forced
to accept its terms.
All of the procedural abuses that have been discussed relate
to one element of the contract-the manifestation of assent. When
interpreting what will be unconscionable, it is necessary to deter-
Id. at 391, 161 A.2d at 87.
0 Yeng Sue Chow v. Levi Strauss & Co., 49 Cal. App. 3d 315, 122 Cal. Rptr.
816 (1975).
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mine whether there was the meeting of the minds that is necessary
to create a valid contract. 3 Those clauses that show a manifesta-
tion of assent by the parties will be approved by the court, and
those that were not agreed to because they were hidden or unread-
able will alert the court to the presence of a procedural abuse and
to the possibility of an unconscionable deal. The terms which rep-
resent procedural abuses are most likely not even known to the
party where they are written in fine print or are hidden clauses,
and if they are known, they are probably not understood because
of the incomprehensibility of the language or one's lack of educa-
tion. To say that a person signing such a contract was agreeing to
all the terms seems to be a gross misstatement for one cannot
assent to that which he does not fully understand. The presence
of the procedural abuse will open the court's eyes to the possibility
of the unconscionability of the entire contract. The next task is to
scrutinize the terms of the contract to decide whether they are so
unfair as to make the contract unenforceable. This unfairness is
found in the substantive abuse of the transaction.
Substantive Abuses
Courts have often said they will not inquire into the adequacy
of consideration given in a contract." This is not always true, as
courts will sometimes look to the difference between the price of
an item and its value to find a harsh, unfair or unreasonable term
called a substantive abuse. There are many cases which view the
excessiveness in price as a substantive abuse, although many opin-
ions do not use the term "substantive abuse." The courts use at
least three different methods for determining price excessiveness:
1) disparity between credit charges and the selling price; 2) dispar-
ity between cost to the seller and the selling price; and 3) disparity
between market value and the selling price.
In a case involving the sale of a refrigerator-freezer, the cost
of the refrigerator to the plaintiff was $348, yet the selling price to
the defendant was $900 plus a $245.88 credit charge.5 5 The total
-" "Assent" is evidenced by a proposition emanating from one side, and accept-
ance of it on the other; the proposition and acceptance together constituting what
is sometimes called a "meeting of the minds." Win. J. Lemp Brewing Co. v. Secor,
21 Okla. 537, 547, 96 P. 636, 639-40 (1908).
See, e.g., Blumenthal v. Heron, 261 Md. 234, 274 A.2d 636 (1971); Ervin v.
Garner, 25 Ohio St. 2d 231, 267 N.E.2d 769 (1971).
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
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charge for the appliance was $1145.88, or more than three times the
actual cost! The court held that this was too hard a bargain and
that the conscience of the court would not allow the contract to be
enforced, but required the defendant to pay the actual cost of
$348.56 In reaching its decision, the court pointed out the fact that
the service charge was almost equal to the cost of the appliance
and found that fact, in and of itself, indicative of oppression and
found the contract unconscionable. 7
In another New York case, the excessive price complaint was
based on the fact that there was a large disparity between the retail
value of a freezer and the plaintiff's selling price." The freezer
purchased here had a maximum retail value of $300. It was sold
to plaintiff for $900 with insurance, credit charges, and tax added
on to make the total charge $1234.80. The court based its finding
of unconscionability on the substantive abuse represented by the
difference in the retail value and the price charged, and found the
sale of a freezer unit having a retail value of $300 for $900 uncon-
scionable as a matter of law.59
Another measure of excessive price which will constitute a
substantive abuse occurs when there is an unjustifiably large dis-
parity between the cost of an item to the seller and the contract
sales price-an inflated markup. American Home Improvement,
Inc. v. MacIver0 provides an example. The agreement was for
home improvements to be made on defendant's property at a cost
of $1759. The actual charge, however, was found to be $2568.60
when the installment payments were totalled. This increase of
actual charges of $809.60 over the agreed contract price evidently
represented the credit and carrying costs. Prior to trial, plaintiff
had also paid $800 as a sales commission in reliance on the con-
tract. Therefore, $1609.60 of the purchase price was attributable
to credit and commission charges, leaving a figure of $959 as the
actual charge for services and materials used in the improvements.
At the time of trial the defendant had paid $1609 and the work
done by plaintiff was negligible at most. It would seem that the
excessive contract price, when compared to the actual charge for
services and materials, would be enough to constitute the excessive
" Id. at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d 759-60.
:7 Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d 759.
"' Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
.' Id. at 191-92, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 266.
90 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
[Vol. 80
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price needed for the substantive abuse, but the court made an even
stronger case and said the contract was unconscionable because
the defendants had received "little or nothing of value for which
they had already paid $1609." ''
Regardless of the price-excessiveness test employed, the UCC
does not give any indications as to what degree of disparity must
be found to constitute an abuse; that determination is left to the
court. This is the better method in that courts should be free to
decide each case independently and not forced to apply a rigid test
to the facts of the case. An example of the unreasonable results
which might come from a strict test can be seen if we hypothecate
a test which declares all charges which exceed the reasonable retail
value by 50% to be unlawfully excessive. The sale of an item, which
regularly retails for $6, for $10 would be excessive, but the sale of
an item, the actual value of which is $7000, for $10,000 would be
approved. The unlawfully excessive deal will have the buyer lose
$4 but the legal deal will cost him $3,000. The grossness of the
disparity in the latter case seems to indicate excessiveness, and in
the former case the loss of only $4 does not seem so grossly unfair
as to be unconscionable, yet the results are just the opposite. On
a $10 deal one cannot be hurt much, but when talking about
$10,000 the cost may involve the entire life savings of a middle
income family. A stronger case is made when the buying party in
a $10,000 contract is a poor person.
Setting a rigid test would not allow the courts to decide these
cases according to the circumstances of each case. When a court
decides the issue of unconscionability, it must take into account
everything contemplated by section 2-302(2) involving the com-
mercial setting and circumstances. The test of what is excessive
pricing must vary with the social setting of which the contract is a
part. A good example involves the ghetto merchant who, because
of his credit risks and costs, should be able to charge a higher price
than the suburban merchant, without his price being considered
excessive. It is logical to compare prices of merchants in similar
locations and circumstances, since the problems and costs to them
should be approximately the same, but the courts must be on the
alert for monopolies, oligopolies, and price fixing, any of which
may make the comparison of prices among merchants in a neigh-
borhood of no avail in determining excessiveness.
a' Id. at 439, 201 A.2d at 889.
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One possible criterion for finding price excessiveness that has
been suggested, but not yet used by the courts, would be to find
an excessive profit on each sale. 2 This test involves the same prob-
lems as the others in defining what is excessive, but there are
added problems with this test in finding what is the actual profit
per unit. It is easy to reduce one's reported profit margin by raising
the reported costs of making the sale. The merchant can do this
by paying large salaries to himself or other officers or by paying
large salesmen's commissions to relatives who may work for him.
Possibly the best test of excessiveness is the one suggested in
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso 3 The court did not enforce that sale
at the price and terms of the contract because it was shocking to
the conscience." This test leaves the ultimate responsibility where
it belongs-in the lap of the court. It is for the court to decide
excessiveness, and it is the court's conscience and the court's val-
uation processes which produce a determination of excessiveness.
Substantive abuses are also found where a party has added
some unfair or restrictive clause. The type of clauses that have
been the subject of such an abuse are varied and the ones dealt
with here are in no way meant to be exhaustive." The first example
of this type of abuse is found in a warranty disclaimer case." The
contract for the sale of automobiles was written in English, but the
defendant understood only Spanish. In the contract, he waived
both the warranty of merchantibility and the warranty of fitness
for purpose without knowing it. The court said the unknowing
waiver coupled with the inequality of bargaining power rendered
the contract unenforceable under section 2-302.67 The unfairness
resulted from the waiver of the warranties, and that waiver was
considered the substantive abuse in the case.
Consequential damage clauses have also been used as a basis
for a substantive abuse. In a Washington case, 8 the contract in-
cluded a clause stating: "In no event shall the seller be liable for
special or consequential damages."69 The court did not find this
92 J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-5 (1972).
13 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
' Id. at 28, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
Other such cases include exculpatory, indemnity, and hold harmless clauses.
E.g., Weaver v. American Oil Co., 257 Ind. 458, 276 N.E.2d 144 (1971).
0 Jefferson Credit Corp. v. Marcano, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1969).
a Id. at 142, 302 N.Y.S.2d at 394-95.
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
Id. at 258, 544 P.2d at 22.
[Vol. 80
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contract to be unconscionable, but did remand the case due to the
lack of facts on the record as to the prior dealing of the two parties.
The court said it did not have sufficient facts to decide whether
this exclusion was standard from prior dealing of the parties or
whether the custom of the trade or practice was to exclude these
damages. "The presence of either of these elements, unless the
trade practice as related to plaintiff was clearly unreasonable,
would support a finding of conscionability in spite of the lack of
'negotiations' or the 'inconspicuous' appearance of the clause.""0
The court was actually saying that the clause was unfair and would
make the contract unconscionable in the absence of other factors,
but that other conditions, such as the parties' prior dealing, could
take this clause out of the unconscionability realm.
The clause leading to an unconscionability finding in the West
Virginia case of Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue7 was a restrictive
cancellation clause. The plaintiff-supplier was permitted to termi-
nate the contract by giving ten days written notice, while the de-
fendant had to provide the plaintiff with sixty days written notice
for the same purpose. The court found the cancellation clause to
be unconscionable on its face, and agreed with the defendants that
the contract was grossly unfair and, as such, was against public.
policy and thus void. The plaintiff could not cancel without show-
ing that the defendant had not substantially performed his obliga-
tions to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff had not done so here.
The substantive abuses must be looked at in conjunction with
section 2-302(2). The substantive abuse term may be abrogated by
the commercial setting in which the contract was negotiated or by
the prior course of dealing between the two parties.72 For example,
a contract in which the price terin seems excessive is not necessar-
ily unconscionable. There are circumstances which could make the
contract enforceable despite the seemingly excessive price, and the
irony of the situation is that circumstances that would constitute
a procedural abuse may be the very factors that negate the uncon-
scionability issue. The excessive price may have been charged due
to the buyer's precarious financial condition or his bad credit rat-
ing. The party's status as a poor person, which might normally
constitute an important factor in a procedural abuse, might be the
factor which justifies the merchant's charging a seemingly exces-
70 Id. at 261, 544 P.2d at 23-24.
' 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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sive price. The merchant must be allowed a greater price to cover
the higher risks inherent in dealing with the economically un-
sound. When considering the circumstances involved, the relevant
elements are the general commercial background and the special
commercial needs of the particular trade involved. 3 This can in-
volve custom and usage in the trade, prior dealings of the two
parties, or any special circumstances involving one or both parties.
Relationship Between Substantive and Procedural Abuses
The hardest question to be decided by the courts is what fac-
tors must be present, and in what degree, in order to find a con-
tract or a clause unconscionable. A majority of the cases have
found that both a procedural and a substantive abuse are neces-
sary and some courts have found that the presence of a gross proce-
dural abuse with a slight substantive abuse will suffice to justify a
finding of unconscionability. By the same token, a gross substan-
tive abuse coupled with a slight procedural abuse may also be
found to constitute unconscionability. Other cases, especially in
the price-value disparity category, have said that a substantive
abuse is all that is needed.
The principal case showing the need for both a procedural and
substantive abuse is Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co.,74
which was discussed earlier. Appellee sold furniture by a contract
that contained a cross-collateral clause in extremely fine print.
The effect of this clause was to keep title to all the goods bought
by Williams in the hands of Walker-Thomas until Williams paid
all the debts she owed on all merchandise bought from the seller.
When Williams defaulted in her payments, Walker-Thomas reple-
vied every item purchased from them. The lower court held for
Walker-Thomas. The appellate court said that unconscionable
contracts are not enforceable and defined unconscionability as in-
cluding an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties (procedural abuse) together with contract terms that are
unreasonably favorable to the other party (substantive abuse). The
procedural abuse here was the incomprehensibility of the clause's
language together with the fine print, and the substantive abuse
was the unfairness of the clause itself. Even though the contract
had been executed before the UCC was adopted, the UCC was
adopted between the contract date and the date of trial. The court
n W. L. May Co. v. Philco-Ford Corp., 273 Ore. 701, 543 P.2d 283 (1975).
7, 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
[Vol. 80
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mentioned that its decision agreed with section 2-302 but was not
based on that section.75
In another case,7" the owner of a fertilizer plant sued his insur-
ance company for a burglary loss he sustained. The insurance com-
pany's definition of burglary was included in the contract fine
print, and the company's agent did not bring the buyer's attention
to it at any time during negotiations. The burglary here did not fall
within the insurance company's definition and they refused to
reimburse the fertilizer company for their $9,982.30 loss. The court
held this definitional clause of the contract unconscionable and
noted that commentators suggest the following factors be exam-
ined in determining unconscionability: assent, unfair surprise,
notice, disparity of bargaining power, and substantive unfairness. 7
In this case the procedural abuse was found in the fine print clause
containing the definition. The substantive unfairness is easily
seen to be the same as a substantive abuse and, in this case, is the
unfairness of the burglary definition clause as applied to the party
contracting for insurarice. His reasonable expectation of the terms
of the contract was not fulfilled. He did not get adequate cover-
age, as one would expect from this type of insurance contract. He
would not expect there to be exclusions written into the burglary
definitions. Had he known this to be the case, he undoubtedly
would have gone elsewhere for his insurance or at least gotten
another policy to handle this contingency.
The most recent case which has come out explicitly stating the
need for both abuses in unconscionability is the case of Wade v.
Austin.7" According to the contract, Austin, who was a real restate
broker, agreed to try to sell Wade's house for a commission. Austin
was to have the sole right to sell the property during the listing
period and would be given compensation if the house was sold
during that period no matter who made the sale. The house was
sold by Wade, who refused to give Austin any compensation. The
court, using section 2-302 of the UCC, did not find the contract
unconscionable. The court noted that two types of abuses must
generally be found for unconscionability. The first is procedural,
which may arise in the contract formation but was absent in this
contract because Wade had listed with Austin previously under the
11 Id. at 449.
71 C. & J. Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169 (Iowa 1975).
n Id. at 181.
71 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
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same terms without complaint. The commercial setting of the deal
negated the procedural abuse. 9 No substantive abuse was found
because there was no unfair action taken by Austin, who used
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser."
These three cases show the majority view that both a substan-
tive and a procedural abuse are required for a finding of uncon-
scionability. Other cases involving price-value disparity have reaf-
firmed the need for both types of abuses before a contract will be
found unconscionable. There are at least two cases that have spe-
cifically stated that price-value disparity itself is not enough to
prove unconscionability.
In Patterson v. Walker-Thomas,8 ' Patterson bought goods
from Walker-Thomas totalling $597.25 and defaulted after making
payments of $248.40. In a suit by Walker-Thomas to recover the
unpaid balance, Patterson based her unconscionability defense on
the fact that the goods were grossly overpriced. There was no evi-
dence introduced to that effect, and the buyer was precluded from
the defense. The appellate court affirmed, saying that excessive
price may be raised in defense as an element of unconscionability.
The court noted that the price term may be examined when deter-
mining a contract's reasonableness, but that it is only one element
of unconscionability and excessive price alone is not unconsciona-
ble.82 Beyond a showing of excessive price, the court wanted a
showing of a lack of meaningful choice available to the parties at
the time they decided to enter into the contract.
Similarly, the court in Kugler v. Romain stated that "an exor-
bitant price ostensibly agreed to by a purchaser of the type in-
volved in this case-but in reality unilaterally fixed by the seller
and not open to negotiation-constitutes an unconscionable bar-
gain. . ."I' Since the price was fixed by the seller and not open to
negotiations, it indicated an absence of meaningful choice (proce-
dural abuse) and this, together with the excessive price (substan-
tive abuse) led to a finding of unconscionability by the court.
These cases are further examples of courts requiring the presence
of both a procedural and substantive abuse, but other cases seem
to suggest that only a substantive abuse is needed.
'Id. at 87.
'Id.
277 A.2d 111 (D.C. App. 1971).
12 Id. at 114.
- 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640, 652 (1971).
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Some cases seem to allow price-value disparity, the substan-
tive abuse, to be unconscionable in and of itself. This analysis was
first used in American Home Improvement, Inc. v. MacIver. In
this case the value of the goods was equal to $959. The contracted
purchase price, however, was $1,759. The court held that since
MacIver received little or nothing of value and had paid $1,609 for
goods valued at far less, the contract should not be enforced. The
disparity between the value and price of the goods is the only abuse
discussed by the court, and commentators have interpreted this
case as saying that a price grossly in excess of the normal retail
value is, in itself, unconscionable."' If this case is closely examined,
however, it is easy to find a procedural abuse also. In the making
of the contract, MacIver signed an instrument that contained a
blank note and a blank power of attorney. Furthermore, the con-
tract did not state the rate of interest or the amount of interest and
other fees to be charged as required by state statute." This is what
put MacIver on an unequal footing in bargaining with American
Home and could easily be designated a procedural abuse.
Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso7 was similarly decided when the
court used price excessiveness as its only criterion for unconsciona-
bility. The Spanish-speaking defendant signed a sales agreement
for $1,145.88 for a refrigerator that cost the plaintiff $348. The
court found that the harsh bargain resulting from the sale of the
freezer at the amount specified was shocking to the conscience and
therefore unenforceable. 8 This substantive abuse is all that is
mentioned. There is no mention of the glaring procedural abuse
inherent in the language barrier which prevented the defendants
from understanding the terms of the contract. This case has been
used as an example of a situation where price-value disparity alone
is enough for unconscionability, but the procedural abuse is defi-
nitely present. It is possible that the court felt either that the abuse
was so obvious that it need not be mentioned or that there was no
need to discuss the procedural abuse. Whatever the court's reason
for ignoring it, the presence of the procedural abuse cannot be
denied, and price-value disparity was not all that was involved in
that case.
'* 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YAu L.J. 757, 790 (1969);
Note, Unconscionability Under the UCC-Two Trends in Cases, 1 Loy. Cm. L.J.
313 (1970).
18 105 N.H. at 437, 201 A.2d at 887.
52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966).
Id. at 27, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
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Two New Jersey cases have also been cited as agreeing with
the proposition that a substantive abuse alone may be enough to
establish unconscionability.8 9 The plaintiff involved in both cases,
Robert Toker, was doing business as Budget Associates of New
Jersey and had purchased the accounts of the defendants from
People's Foods. An agent of People's Foods visited Perl's home and
talked to the defendants about various food plans. When defen-
dants mentioned that they couldn't store the amount of food dis-
cussed, the agent stated that a freezer was included in the plan.
Mr. Perl signed three forms pertaining to the food plan; then Mrs.
Perl did the same. The next day the defendants discovered they
had signed an installment contract for the purchase of a freezer in
addition to the food plan and attempted to cancel the contract.
The freezer and food were delivered. The maximum value of the
freezer was $300, but the entire charge for it was $1,092.96, includ-
ing a purchase price of $799.95 and tax, insurance, and credit
charges of $293.01. The installment contract was then assigned to
Toker. In its opinion the court says: "The exorbitant price of the
freezer makes this contract unconscionable and therefore unen-
forceable."90 There is another part of this case that is sometimes
overlooked. The contract was not found unenforceable due only to
the unconscionability. Fraud was also involved here, and that
came about by the knowing misrepresentations by People's Foods
as to the contents of the contract." The defendants were led to
believe that the freezer was included in the price of the food plan
and never knew they were signing an installment contract for the
purchase of a freezer; so this case is decided on two points, fraud
and unconscionability. The court found it easy to say that the
contract was unconscionable because of the excessive price, but it
discussed unconscionability only after the fraud had been found.
Fraud was the determining factor here, and unconscionability was
merely a side issue. Had the court not found sufficient evidence of
fraud and had to decide the case purely on unconscionability
grounds, it could have used the abuses which occurred when the
contract was executed. Unconscionability is only quasi-fraud or, at
most, has connotations of fraud. It is not truly fraud for there is
an element of fraud missing in unconscionability that was present
in this case, that is, a misrepresentation of a material fact.2
0 Toker v. Westerman, 113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970); Toker v. Perl,
103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968).
103 N.J. Super. at 503, 247 A.2d at 703.
Id. at 502, 247 A.2d at 702.
'2 The elements necessary to establish fraud are representation of existing fact,
[Vol. 80
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Toker v. Westerman" also involved the sale of a refrigerator
freezer by People's Foods. The cash price for the appliance was
$899.98 and the total charge was $1,229.76. Westerman refused to
pay the balance of $573.89 and claimed unconscionability due to
overpricing. The reasonable retail value of the freezer had been
estimated at $350 to $400. This court used Toker v. Per194 as
precedent to decide that the contract was unconscionable due to
the excessiveness in price. The court erred in following Toker v.
Perl because it is possible to see the language in that case concern-
ing unconscionability as mere dictum. Regardless of the error of
citing Toker v. Perl, the decision was probably correct since it is
possible to find a procedural abuse in the facts of this case. The
seller was a door-to-door salesman who took advantage of the
economic position of this defendant who was a welfare recipient.
The resulting inequality of bargaining power would constitute a
procedural abuse.
What these cases seem to say is that a large price-value dis-
parity in itself will be enough to label a transaction unconscion-
able. But in looking closer, it can be seen that there are proce-
dural abuses in all of the cases.
Courts have said that they will not relieve a person from a bad
bargain. 5 That seems to be what is done when they decide cases
only on the basis of a substantive abuse, but the presence of proce-
dural abuses, though overlooked or unremarked in the opinion,
brings these cases in line with those which require both procedural
and substantive abuses. Without that procedural abuse, the courts
would be doing just what they have said they would not, that is,
relieving a person from a bad bargain.
In a recent West Virginia case, the court seemingly decided
the unconscionability issue on the presence of a substantive abuse
alone." Ashland Oil Company and Donahue entered into a lease
agreement and a dealer contract for one year beginning November
1, 1968, subject to certain termination provisions. The lease agree-
ment allowed either party to cancel in writing not less than ten
its materiality and falsity, speaker's knowledge of its falsity, his intent that it shall
be acted upon by person to whom made, such person's ignorance of its falsity,
reliance on truth of representation and right to rely thereon, and consequent dam-
age to him. Graff v. Geisel, 39 Wash. 2d 131, 234 P.2d 884, 889 (1951).
113 N.J. Super. 452, 274 A.2d 78 (1970).
g' 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247 A.2d 701 (1968).
" See, e.g., Wade v. Austin, 524 S.W.2d 79 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
', Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Donahue, 223 S.E.2d 433 (W. Va. 1976).
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days before the end of the lease period, but a provision in the dealer
contract allowed Ashland to terminate upon ten days written no-
tice to Donahue if, in the opinion of Ashland, Donahue had done
anything to impair the quality, good name, or reputation of the
goods or products of the seller, Ashland. This provision in the
dealer contract was in addition to a clause allowing either party
to terminate the agreement within sixty days without cause. On
February 7, 1975, Ashland terminated both the lease agreement
and the dealer contract by separate letters. Donahue refused to
leave the premises, and Ashland brought this suit to recover pos-
session of that property. In the opinion, written by Justice Wilson,
the Supreme Court of Appeals found that the documents were so
interrelated that each would be meaningless without the other and
neither party would have entered into either of them separately.
Therefore, reasoned the court, the two instruments should be con-
strued together and considered as one.9" The court found the ten
day cancellation clause in the dealer contract, available only to
Ashland, unconscionable on its face and went on to say that it was
unnecessary to base the holding upon any disparity of bargaining
power between the two parties. The court seemed to say that a
procedural abuse is not needed, especially in view of the absence
of evidence of such an abuse in the case itself. It cannot be deter-
mined whether the clause was hidden in fine print or whether this
was a contract of adhesion due to Ashland's possible contrived
monopoly in the area, but there are hints in the case that there
may have been a procedural abuse. First of all, Justice Wilson did
not say there was no disparity of bargaining power; he merely said
"we do not find it necessary to base our holding upon a disparity
of bargaining power."" Also, Donahue, in answer to Ashland's
complaint, alleged that the agreement was void as against public
policy because it was unfair and the plaintiff was in a grossly
superior bargaining position. ' There is nothing in the opinion
indicating why Donahue thought Ashland had the grossly superior
position. Since these issues were not discussed, a procedural abuse
cannot affirmatively be ascribed to these circumstances, although
it is quite possible one might be found in the form contract. The
case seems to suggest that the substantive abuse itself will lead to
unconscionability, and the treatment of this case in future opin-
"1 Id. at 437.
" Id. at 440.
Id. at 440.
' Id. at 437.
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ions will be especially noteworthy with respect to whether that
suggestion proves to be true. If that suggestion is accepted and
courts begin to hold the substantive abuse to be enough for uncon-
scionability, this will leave many unanswered questions. Will any
type of substantive abuse be enough for unconscionability? If so,
how unfair must it be? Must it be grossly unfair only? Can the
presence of a procedural abuse help make a contract unconsciona-
ble if the substantive abuse is not enough?
The approach most often used to decide unconscionability is
that of applying the procedural and substantive abuses on a sort
of sliding scale. When the terms of the contract seem exceedingly
harsh only a very small procedural abuse will be needed. Likewise,
when the contract formation process is grossly unfair the courts
will accept a slight substantive abuse. The price-value disparity
cases discussed above are good examples of courts ignoring the
procedural abuse after finding the harsh substantive one. On the
hypothetical sliding scale, the substantive abuses were so harsh
that the courts did not feel constrained even to mention the proce-
dural abuse.
At the other end of the scale, there is one case illustrating
extensive procedural abuses which reduced the need for a substan-
tive abuse. The case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.'1
involved a number of different procedural abuses. The contract
had a fine print clause, a clause hidden on the back of the contract,
and a clause containing incomprehensible language. To top it all
off, these clauses were part of an adhesion contract. The substan-
tive abuse here was the presence of a disclaimer of warranties. This
was not very unfair since this type of disclaimer can possibly be
acceptable under section 2-316 of the UCC.02
CONCLUSION
The Sales article of the UCC was written to apply to transac-
tions of goods' 3 and Section 2-302 thereof has been applied most
often to dealings between merchants and consumers. Unconsciona-
bility is a developing doctrine, however, and courts have already
101 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
M U.C.C. § 2-316(l):
Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express warranty and
words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be construed
wherever reasonable as consistent with each other. ...
I- U.C.C. § 2-102.
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extended the statute by analogy into other areas of the law or have
used the doctrine as an alternative basis for their holdings.'" The
earliest unconscionability cases in this country were decided in the
late nineteenth century.' 5 Since unconscionability is a common-
law defense, the courts should feel free to continue to develop the
law and their interpretations of it and to extend its application into
other areas of the law without worrying about being accused of
judicial lawmaking.
When the courts do extend this law, they must be certain not
to change it so much as to obliterate completely the intent of the
draftsmen. They will be faced with the question of whether they
should require the presence of a procedural and a substantive
abuse or whether only one of them will suffice. The draftsmen did
not set out to alter one's freedom to contract when they wrote this
section; they merely wanted to protect those people who are vir-
tually defenseless in contract formations. To keep within both of
these strictures, both a substantive and a procedural abuse should
be found. This seems to be the better view since the courts will
then allow the parties to live with a bad bargain that was made
with no unequal bargaining power. Therefore, unfairness and ine-
quality of bargaining power should be required for a finding of
unconscionability. But because this law was only recently codified,
it will be some time before we will see the true impact that this
section will have on our commercial law.
Kevin D. Dolan
,o Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
10 E.g., Hume v. United States, 104 U.S. 406 (1889).
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